Regulation of Lobbyists in Developed Countries
Current Rules and Practices
This study was requested by the Local Government Policy Section, Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. It was drafted by:

Dr. Margaret Mary Malone  
Lecturer in European Studies  
Institute of Public Administration  
57-61 Lansdowne Road  
Dublin 4

Tel: 01 240 36 00  
Fax: 01 668 91 35  
Email: mmalone@ipa.ie
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Executive Summary

This Report sets out the current state of play in respect of the rules and practices regulating lobbyist activity in parliamentary systems in advanced democracies worldwide.

The main finding is that countries with specific rules and regulations governing the activities of lobbyists and interest groups are more the exception than the rule. Within the European Union the German Bundestag is unique in that it is the only Chamber which has specific and formal rules regarding the registration of lobbyists. All groups seeking to articulate or defend an interest must register with the Bundestag. This register, which is available to the public, is published annually. The UK, on the other hand, has opted to regulate the lobbied rather than the lobbyists. This was principally due to the vexed issue of finding a generally acceptable definition of what constitutes a lobbyist. As Baggott puts it: “virtually everything that moves in the political arena becomes in effect a pressure group” (Baggott, 1995). Therefore, a guide to the rules relating to the conduct for Members of the House of Commons was introduced in 1996 and updated in 2002. It deals with the obligation on MPs *inter alia* to disclose all outside sources of remuneration which involve the provision of services in their capacity as MPs. The Guide also deals with the explicit ban on MPs from “lobbying for reward or consideration.”

Beyond the EU, the USA and Canada are the only examples in this Report of states which have introduced statutory regulation of lobbyists. The USA has the longest tradition of formal regulation. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 however defined lobbyists so inadequately that it had to be repealed and replaced by the Lobby Restrictions Act of 1995 which has a much wider definition. There is a more elaborate approach in Canada where different types of lobbyists are identified in the Lobbyists Registration Act of 1989 as revised in 1995 and 2002.

Defining lobbyists is fraught with difficulties. In the case of Australia, so inadequate was the Lobbyists Registration Scheme of 1983 in this respect that it was decided to abolish the Scheme in 1996 as it was deemed unenforceable.

The European Parliament devised an innovative strategy to formal regulation which was based on self-definition and incentives thus obviating the need to define a lobbyist. Frequent visitors to the European Parliament intent on supplying its Members with information may obtain a permanent pass to facilitate access to Parliament premises in return for respecting a code of conduct and signing a public register.

In those countries where informal practices prevail there is some evidence to suggest that the issue of regulating lobbyists more formally is advancing up the political agenda. Parliamentary systems are coming under growing pressure to take account of the necessity of balancing interest articulation and such fundamental democratic principles as the freedoms of expression and association within the system of governance with practices that are consistent with transparency, probity, and equal access to the democratic process. Such public and political pressure typically arises from specific crises or scandals which throws the media spotlight on the relationship between interest groups on the one hand and politicians and bureaucrats on the other.

At the same time, formal regulation is not universally regarded as a panacea. In the UK the prevailing view is that statutory regulation could inadvertently confer special status on lobbyists. This could give rise to the impression that some lobbyists are more favoured or privileged than others. Also, the experience of countries such as Australia points to the
inevitable limitations of any legislative attempt to regulate all kinds of lobbyist activity, given the indirect and informal nature of much of it. Finally, as the case of Japan illustrates, the political culture of a country may also play a central role in the success or failure of any attempt to regulate lobbyists.

The aim for each country is to devise a regime which is effective and takes account of its own governmental structure and practices and political and administrative culture. Only a minority of systems favour formal statutory regulation; other less formal practices, including codes of conduct, are the norm. Whichever approach is adopted, throwing public light on the relationship between civil society and government (politicians and bureaucrats) is increasingly regarded as a desirable and necessary development in the interests of good governance.
**Introduction**

The objective of this Report is to set out a general indication of the state of play in respect of the rules and practices regulating lobbyist activity in parliamentary systems in advanced democracies worldwide.

The survey covers in alphabetical order: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

The systems surveyed display a wide diversity of parliamentary democracies from four continents. They differ in age from young systems such as Germany and Japan to older democracies such as the USA and the UK. They also exhibit different characteristics arising out of different cultures, political traditions and historical experience. As such, the survey offers a wide range of experience and approaches relating to regulating relations between civil society and government (politicians and bureaucrats).

A summary table of the systems surveyed is presented in Appendix B.
**Australia**

There are no rules or procedures regulating lobbyists in the Australian system. Australia flirted only briefly with regulating lobbyists and is unlikely to repeat the exercise. As in the UK and New Zealand, the preferred approach is to regulate the lobbied rather than the lobbyist.

The Lobbyists Registration Scheme was introduced in 1983 as a result of the so-called Combe Affair. David Combe, a former Labour Party employee, was a lobbyist in the early 1980s with an extensive network of contacts particularly with the Labour government of the day. He had a relationship with an official in the Soviet Embassy who was later expelled by the Australian authorities as a KGB spy. Combe was considered to be a security risk given his close relationship with Labour ministers. In reaction and to counter adverse criticism, the government moved quickly to establish the Lobbyists Registration Scheme by executive decision in December 1983. This rather limited Scheme defined a lobbyist very narrowly as “a person (or company) who, for financial or other advantage, represents a client in dealings with Commonwealth Government ministers and officials.” The Scheme set up two confidential registers: a special one for lobbyists representing foreign clients and a general one for lobbyists representing domestic clients. The Scheme required lobbyists to apply to register each time they took on a client and to give a short description of the task undertaken. As registered lobbyists, they were then required to produce a letter of acceptance from the Registrar whenever contacting ministers or officials about this task.

The Scheme was widely acknowledged to be ineffective with its provisions not often adhered to and rarely enforced. One attempt to strengthen it in 1991 by Senator Nick Bolkus failed due to lack of support from the government and the bureaucracy. The Howard government which took office in March 1996 decided to abolish the Scheme. The main reasons cited were that the requirements of the Scheme were not being adhered to and that the register was not available for public scrutiny. As the responsible minister bluntly put it: “frankly, it was a toothless tiger and its provisions were really unenforceable” (Warhurst, 1998: 547).

The approach in Australia is that it is more productive to target the lobbied rather than the lobbyist. When John Howard became prime minister in 1996 he introduced a ministerial code of conduct – this code was considered to be a key element in his electoral victory. The Howard Code of Conduct, as it is known, prohibits inter alia ministers from “accepting retainers or income from personal exertion other than that laid down as their remuneration as ministers and parliamentarians.” In addition, ministers are required to resign directorships in public companies and may retain directorships in private companies only if retention is not likely to conflict with the minister’s public duty. Ministers are required to divest themselves of all shares and similar interests in any company or business involved in the area of their portfolio responsibilities. The transfer of interests to a family member or to a nominee or trust is not an acceptable form of divestment. Ministers are required to make statements of interests in accordance with arrangements determined by the prime minister. Ministers may not accept any benefit where acceptance might give an appearance that they may be subject to improper influence. Ministers may accept benefits in the form of gifts, sponsored travel or hospitality only in accordance with the relevant guidelines provided by the prime minister.

Subsequently, in December 1998 following his second electoral victory, John Howard updated the Code by issuing “A Guide on key elements of ministerial responsibility.” The Guide advises ministers that “in dealing with a lobbyist who is acting on behalf of a third party, it is important to establish who or what company or what interests that lobbyist represents so that informed judgements can be made about the outcome they are seeking to achieve.”
This system is open to criticism. As Dr John Uhr of the Research School of Social Sciences points out, ministers who breach the Code of Conduct are not investigated by an external body or held accountable by anyone except the prime minister. In Uhr’s view, “given that the document is not a law or regulation and that it does not even have any formal parliamentary authorisation, there is nothing to stop the Prime Minister as author of the document from using his authority to alter or amend it or to interpret it as he sees fit.” (John Uhr, “Howard’s ministerial code”, Res Publica, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1998).

In short, the system in Australia highlights how ministerial codes of conduct in Westminster-type systems are generally controlled by the executive itself rather than the parliament (Deirdre McKeown, www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/POL/CodeConduct.htm)

**Austria**

The Rules of Procedure of neither house of parliament, the National Council or the Federal Council, contain any provisions relating to the activities of lobbyists or interest groups in terms of the formulation and development of federal legislation. There is no official register of interest groups in Austria.

However, large economic interest groups such as employers’ organisations and trade unions do have a significant input into the making of law in the context of the “social partnership.” When preparing a bill, the government must consult with the chambers or Kammern, which are statutory representatives of interest groups, under the “appraisal procedure.” In general, the government consults not only the chambers but other interest groups also. At the parliamentary stage, the social partners exert influence through personal and political contacts. In the past, such informal contacts were greatly facilitated by the fact that more than 50% of MPs had close ties or were members of interest groups such as employers’ associations or trade unions. This is no longer the case.

In addition, experts representing interest groups may be invited to address a parliamentary committee and assist it in its deliberations on a bill under the Rules of Procedure of the National Council (section 40 paragraph 1) and those of the Federal Council (section 33 paragraph 1).

**Belgium**

There are no rules or procedures regulating lobbyists in the Belgian parliamentary system.

So far, lively debates on the subject have resulted in no formal proposals for such legislation. There is support among some lobbyists for a voluntary code of conduct and a register supervised by an independent arbitrator. Members of the Representative Association of Public Relations already have a voluntary code of conduct. Former PR personnel who have become political lobbyists are now interested in introducing a similar code for themselves as they believe it would help to confer greater respectability on their profession.

**Canada**

Canada has statutory rules and regulations relating to the regulation of lobbyists.
The Lobbyists Registration Act came into effect in September 1989. The Act defined lobbying as direct communication with federal office-holders for the purpose of influencing the formulation or implementation of public policy. Interestingly, the Act made a distinction between two types of lobbyists. **Tier I** lobbyists are those who lobby on behalf of clients in return for payment. They were required to provide the names of their clients and the policy area in which representations were made. They had to register within ten days of arrangements being made. **Tier II** lobbyists are those employed in whole or in part to lobby on behalf of their own employers. They were only required to register the name of the organisation for whom lobbying was carried out and the name of the employee concerned. They must register once a year only or within two months of commencing lobbying activity.

The registers are maintained by the Lobbyists Registration Branch which is part of the Department of Industry. All information is stored electronically and may be publicly inspected. The register has been available to the public via the Internet since September 1996.

The 1989 Act was amended in 1995. While the distinction between Tier I and Tier II lobbyists was maintained, the categories were renamed and Tier II lobbyists were divided into two groups. Tier I lobbyists became known as “consultant lobbyists” and Tier II as either “in-house (corporate)” and “in-house (organisations)” lobbyists. In addition, all lobbyists were now required to give more information on their lobbying activities. They must give details on the legislative proposal or bill or regulation concerned; reveal any corporate linkages of clients; notify any government funding; and disclose any arrangements with clients for contingency fees. Also, a code of ethics for lobbyists was made mandatory. The code of ethics was drawn up by the Federal Ethics Counsellor in consultation with lobbyists. It revolves around such principles as integrity, openness and professionalism while its rules fall under three headings: transparency, confidentiality and conflict of interest.

The Lobbyists Registration Act was amended again in June 2003 to take account of recommendations of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. Bill C-15, as it is known, clarifies three categories of lobbyists in line with the 1995 amendment. They are: a **Consultant Lobbyist** who lobbies on behalf of a client; an **In-house Lobbyist (Corporate)** who is an employee of a corporation lobbying on behalf of her employer; and an **In-house Lobbyist (Organization)** who is an employee of an organisation which is a not-for-profit organisation. Bill C-15 introduced three main changes. First, it removed the Ethics Counsellor from any involvement with monitoring or investigating lobbying activity and transferred that role to the Registrar of Lobbyists. Second, it closed the loophole which had enabled a lobbyist to be exempt from the obligation to register if he or she was responding to “a written request from a public office holder, for advice or comment.” Instead, lobbyists are only exempt from registering where the only purpose of the communication is to request information from the public office holder. Third, the Bill provided a clearer definition of lobbying.

As in the USA, lobbyist regulation as amended in Canada is accredited with making the activities of professional lobbyists more transparent and is regarded as a healthy development in governance.

**Denmark**

There are no formal rules or legislation governing the regulation of lobbyists in the Danish parliamentary system. There is, however, a number of established practices which amount to a *de facto* recognition of interest groups.
Interest groups, which lobby Standing Committees of the Folketing by means of delegations or petitions, must have their names recorded in the archives of these Committees and have working documents registered as a matter of course. Their names are also given in committee reports submitted to the Folketing and are published in the Danish parliamentary journal, *Folketingstidende*.

On 3 April 1991, the Standing Orders Committee of the Folketing adopted “Rules on access to the written material of parliamentary committees and access to information held in the parliamentary database of committee documents (FTU).” According to these Rules, the public has access to all written material from the committees of the Folketing, including petitions to standing committees and individual members of the Folketing, which is collected in the archives of the Folketing.

The main rules, which govern the admittance of delegations permitted to address a Standing Committee, include the following:

- Members of the delegation must have a natural affiliation to the person, organisation, association and so on applying for admittance to the Committee (e.g. a lawyer, member, or employee). Persons without any credible affiliation to the delegation are not allowed to participate in the hearing.
- The spokesperson of a delegation, who may be assisted by other participants, is entitled to make a short statement of the delegation’s position to the Committee.
- Following this statement, the members of the Committee may ask questions and receive replies from the delegation.
- The meeting is not a forum for negotiations. The viewpoints of the delegation are included in the deliberations of the Committee.
- The delegation may not put questions to members of the Committee.
- The hearing is normally no more than 10 to 15 minutes.

It is expected that 60 copies of written material for the Committee be sent to the Committees Department of the Folketing in sufficient time to enable members of the Committee to study its contents.

Details of the names, affiliation and so on of the members of the Delegation must be submitted to the Committees Department in good time. Any changes to the composition of the delegation must be notified to the Committees Department no later than one day before the hearing.

The Danish system is therefore characterised by unwritten traditions. Given the corporatist tradition of Denmark, relations between large interest groups and government (parliament and administration) tend to be well developed. There is evidence to suggest however that in recent years the growing number of smaller professional lobbyists is beginning to make its presence felt. It is possible that this development could lead to statutory regulation of lobbyists in the future.

**European Union**

The European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers are the principal actors in the formulation and development of European law in the first pillar of the Union namely, the European Community. Each institution has a different approach to dealing with lobbyists and interest group representations.
With the advent of direct elections in 1979, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have become increasingly the target of lobbyists’ attention. In May 1991, Marc Galle MEP, Chairman of the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities, was appointed to submit proposals for a code of conduct and a public register of lobbyists accredited by Parliament. The Galle report, which was delivered in October 1992, came to naught due principally to the vexed issue of arriving at a definition of what constituted a “lobbyist” and also time pressure arising out of the European Parliament elections in June 1994.

The issue of regulating lobbyists remained high on the political agenda of MEPs particularly in light of the introduction of the codecision procedure by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union which came into effect in 1993. The codecision procedure involves the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament jointly adopting legislation. Clearly, lobbyist activity was set to intensify as the European Parliament began to look more and more like a veritable legislative chamber. Consequently, following the 1994 elections, a fresh attempt was made to regulate lobbyists. Glyn Ford MEP was appointed to present proposals on lobbying in the European Parliament. At the same time, Jean-Thomas Nordmann MEP was appointed to draw up a report on the declaration of Members’ financial interests. The two reports were to become inextricably linked.

Reporting in 1995, Ford proposed that the College of Quaestors (a body of five senior MEPs with responsibilities for administrative, financial and housekeeping matters concerning MEPs individually – see Corbett et al, 2000: 103 and passim) should issue permanent passes to persons who wished to enter Parliament frequently with a view to supplying information to MEPs within the framework of their parliamentary work. In short, Ford’s innovative strategy was to avoid the definitional problems of what constituted a lobbyist which so bedeviled the Galle report and instead to base the new procedure on incentives. Lobbyists’ visits to Parliament would be greatly facilitated by the granting of permanent passes in return for respecting a code of conduct and signing a public register.

The Ford report (which focussed on outsiders) together with the Nordmann report (which focussed on Members) were adopted by the European Parliament in plenary in July 1996. The new rules are annexed to the Parliament’s rules of procedure. In short, on foot of the Ford report, the College of Quaestors may under Rule 9(2) grant a permanent pass to representatives of interest groups in exchange for acceptance of a code of conduct and registration. The passes, which must be worn throughout the visit in a visible manner, are valid for one year and may be renewed. The ten-point Code of Conduct for Lobbyists is set out in Article 3 of Annex IX of the Rules of Procedure and is reproduced in Appendix A. The public register of lobbyists is kept by the College of Quaestors and has recently been made available publicly via the Parliament’s website.

On foot of the Nordmann report, Rule 9(1) provides for a code of conduct for MEPs which is set out in Annex 1 to the Rules of Procedure. All MEPs must make a detailed declaration of their professional activities and any additional support granted to them by third parties. Such information must be entered into a public register which is kept by the College of Quaestors. In essence, MEPs must refrain from accepting any gift or benefit in the performance of their duties. Similarly, registered assistants must also declare any other paid activities (Article 2 of Annex IX).
The European Commission

In contrast to the European Parliament which has sought to establish a formal regulatory framework for lobbyists, the European Commission has mainly sought to encourage self-regulation. As the initiator of Community legislation, the Commission looks to interest groups to provide it with expert and specialised information and knowledge particularly in highly technical dossiers. Consulting with “interested parties” or “civil society organisations” as the Commission prefers to describe such organisations is an important resource from a governance point of view. The Commission makes its “Directory of non-profit making civil society organisations” available publicly via its website.

The Commission has a well-established reputation for being the most accessible of all the institutions to lobbyists and other interested groups. From the lobbyist’s point of view the Commission is the primary institution where the lobbying process begins. In the opinion of some authors, “you don’t lobby the European Parliament or the Council, but you lobby the Commission through the Parliament or the Council” (European Parliament, 2003: 40).

The ever-increasing number of lobbyists in Brussels has led the Commission to concentrate on an “inner core” of interest groups which are usually well-established and well-resourced. This has resulted in “secondary lobbying” where smaller, newer and/or less institutionalised groups lobby those interest groups which are part of this “inner core.” This new strategy was confirmed by the White Paper on European Governance (COM (2001)428 fin. (OJ C 287 of 12 October 2001, pp. 1-29) which places particular emphasis on consultation and dialogue with “civil society organisations.”

In summary, for the Commission the guiding principle is “to give interested parties a voice, but not a vote” (European Parliament, 2003: 39).

The Council

In stark contrast to either the Commission or the Parliament, the Council is well known to be the least accessible of the EU institutions.

The Council secretariat keeps no list of lobbyists and the official line is that all contact with lobbyists and NGOs is dealt with by the European Commission.

Finland

There are no rules or legislation governing the regulation of lobbyists in the Finnish parliamentary system. Interest groups are not registered in the Finnish parliament. Lobbyists may contact members of parliament informally as they wish and there are no rules or regulations of any sort.

France

National Assembly

There are no formal rules or regulations in respect of lobbyists nor is there any code of ethics in the French National Assembly. There is no list or register (public or otherwise) of pressure or interest groups. There is only one formal provision: according to Article 26(1) of the general directives of the bureau of the National Assembly, those with special cards issued personally by the President or by the Quaestors (as in the European Parliament, this is a body of senior
parliamentarians with responsibilities relating to administrative and housekeeping details for Members of the National Assembly) may have access to the Salon de la Paix (a chamber which regularly hosts debates with Members and invited guests on topical issues).

In practice, there are approximately 20 public affairs representatives of a small number of large public firms (e.g. Electricité de France) and a few institutional bodies (e.g. Caisse des dépots et consignations) or agencies representing a professional organisation (e.g. Chambres consulaires).

Many other lobbyists may have access to certain areas within the National Assembly at the request of one or more deputies. In this way, the points of view of many large private companies or professional and trade union organisations may be put forward.

Deputies are prohibited by Article 79 of the rules of procedure from using their position and status or allowing it to be used for any purpose other than the performance of their public duties. Non-compliance could lead to disciplinary sanctions. Deputies are also prohibited from belonging to any association or group which defends private, local or professional interests or from making any commitments to such groups regarding their parliamentary activities, if such membership or commitments involve accepting mandatory instructions.

**Senate**

Lobbyists and pressure groups are not registered in the French Senate. Professional groups or organisations which wish to gain access to the Senate must first apply to the Presidency of the Senate. The request is then processed by the General Secretariat of the Presidency which may authorise access to the Palais (the seat of the Senate) and also access to the corridors of the Salle des Séances (the Chamber itself), if the professional group is considered sufficiently important and representative. Examples include Barreau de Paris, Chambre des notaires, Assemblée permanente des Chambres d'agriculture, Electricité de France, Gaz de France.

Such a request may also be addressed to the College of Quaestors (a body of Senators responsible for administrative and financial matters concerning individual Senators). The College of Quaestors may issue a pass for the Salle des Conférences and the Galerie des Bustes, where meetings with Senators are possible. However, no access is given to the Salle des Séances.

Approximately 20 passes are issued each year by the College of Quaestors while a dozen or so authorisations for access to the corridors of the Salle des Séances are granted by the General Secretariat of the Presidency.

There is no formal code of conduct for lobbyists. However, any lobbyist whose behaviour is deemed to be inappropriate may be the subject of an oral recommendation or be declared persona non grata if senators so request.

**Germany**

There are specific rules and regulations governing the activity of lobbyists in the German system.
**Bundestag**

The Bundestag is the only house of parliament in the EU member states which has specific rules set out in an annex to its rules of procedure. Annex 2 of the rules of procedure of the Bundestag requires that all groups and organisations wishing to express or defend their interests before the Bundestag or the Federal Government must be entered in a register. This register, which is drawn up each year, is published in the federal gazette (*Bundesgesetzblatt*).

In principle, lobbyists may not be heard by parliamentary committees or be issued with a pass admitting them to parliamentary buildings until they are entered on the register. The following details must be submitted: name and seat of the group; composition of board of directors and board of management; sphere of interest; number of members; names of appointed representatives; address of group’s or association’s office at the seat of the Bundestag and of the Federal Government. The public register lacks any legal force. The aim of the register is to identify clearly lobbyists and interest groups which supply information to the Bundestag and its committees. Registration confers no special status or privileges such as an automatic right to be consulted at parliamentary hearings.

The Bundestag however has significant discretion: it may unilaterally declare an entry pass invalid, and the Bundestag and its committees may invite associations or experts who do not appear on the register to their meetings as they deem appropriate. Therefore, not being entered in the register does not necessarily prohibit contact with parliamentary committees or Members. As a substantial number of Members of the Bundestag are or were members of trade unions or employers’ associations, there is inevitably a good deal of political and personal contact between such groups and individual Members.

**Bundesrat**

There are no rules governing lobbyists and their activities.

**Greece**

There are no rules regulating lobbyists in Greece as the notion of lobbying or interest group activities is not to be found in Greek law.

**Ireland**

While no formal or statutory system for regulating or registering lobbyists exists, a range of ethical provisions govern the lobbied such as office holders (e.g. Taoiseach, Tánaiste, Ministers, Ministers of State etc.), TDs, Senators and civil and public servants. These provisions are outlined below:-

**Declarations of Interest**

Under the Ethics in Public Office Act, 1995 TDs, Senators and civil and other public servants are expected to declare financial and other interests including any remunerated position as a lobbyist, consultant and so on. Similar provisions apply under Part 15 of the Local Government Act, 2001 to local government employees and councillors.
Codes of Conduct

The current code of conduct for office holders was introduced in July 2003 and was drawn up by the government pursuant to Section 10(2) of the Standards in Public Office Act, 2001. It applies to the Taoiseach, Tanaiste, Ministers, Ministers of State, Attorney General (where the AG is a member of either House), Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson of the Dáil or Seanad, and the Chairperson of a designated Dáil or Seanad or joint Oireachtas committee. The code advises that officer holders’ dealings with lobbyists should “be conducted so that they do not give rise to a conflict between public duty and private interest.” It further advises that, at official meetings, the office holder should be accompanied by a note-taker. The code also advises that office holders should not engage in any activities that could reasonably be regarded as interfering or being incompatible with the full and proper discharge by them of the duties of their office. In addition, it advises that an office holder should not carry on a professional practice while holding office or take part in any decision making or management of the affairs of a company or practice.

In February 2002 Dáil Eireann adopted a Code of Conduct for TDs other than office holders: “to maintain the public trust placed in them, and exercise the influence gained from their membership of Dáil Eireann to advance the public interest.” Seanad Eireann adopted a similar code in respect of their members in April 2002. These codes do not specifically mention lobbying.

A draft civil service code of conduct prepared by the Department of Finance prohibits civil servants from making representations on behalf of an outside association or organisation as an individual or as a member of a delegation in relation to matters for which the Department concerned has responsibility without the consent of the head of office. A similar provision is set out for local government employees in a draft local government code prepared by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government.

Standards in Public Office Commission

The independent Standards in Public Office Commission is a permanent statutory body which was set up to monitor, investigate and regulate the conduct of those elected or those who are employed in the public service. The Commission may take account of any code prepared under Standards in Public Office Act, 2001 in relation to any of its proceedings under the Act.

Strengthened Corruption Legislation

The Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001 sponsored by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform strengthened the law on corruption and includes a presumption of corruption in certain circumstances.

Duty to maintain standards and employment prohibition

Councillors and local government employees are subject to a general duty to maintain proper standards of integrity, conduct and concern for the public interest (section 168 of Local Government Act, 2001). In addition, local government employees are prohibited by law (section 159 of the Local Government Act, 2001) from undertaking any outside occupation which conflicts with the interests of a local authority or is inconsistent with the discharge of public duties.
**Legislative and other proposals**

The Government has accepted in principle the need for some mechanism for dealing with lobbyists. A Government statement of December 2000 indicated that: “it is the Government’s intention to introduce a regulation and registration system for those who operate on a paid basis as lobbyists in one form or another seeking to exert influence on political and public service decision making.” Subsequently, Minister of State at the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Mr Tom Kitt TD, submitted a paper for consideration by the Joint Committee on Members’ Interests. The paper dealt with the Regulation of Lobbyists examining such issues as definition, registration, regulation, obligations and costs.

The Labour Party recently introduced a Private Member’s Bill entitled “Registration of Lobbyists Bill, 2003” following from similar earlier proposals which did not proceed. Its purpose is to “provide in the public interest for the registration of paid lobbyists and, to the greatest extent possible consistent with the public interest in free and open access to central and local government, for the disclosure of their activities.” This bill provides for information on lobbyists’ activities to be filed with the Standards in Public Office Commission. The bill sets out a Code of Conduct for lobbyists. It also proposes to prohibit a member of the Dáil or the Seanad from engaging in lobbyist activity and to ban “special advisers” and public office holders from lobbyist activity for the duration of their service and for two years thereafter. Under the Bill the responsible Minister is the Minister for Finance.

Professional bodies such as the Public Relations Institute of Ireland (PRII) and the Public Relations Consultants Association (PRCA) follow such proposed legislation very closely. The PRII and the PRCA set up a Joint Working Group to examine the 1999 and 2000 legislative proposals. The Group concluded that openness and transparency in respect of lobbyist activity could be achieved if there was clear code of conduct for those leaving public office and if lobbyists for their part adhered to codes of ethics and professional conduct. Both the PRII and the PRCA have their own voluntary professional code of ethics and conduct and, as such, are examples of self-regulation in the Irish context. Both bodies support the idea of enshrining such codes in legislation.

The development of Government proposals regarding lobbyists is now under consideration by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government in light of the reform of the regulatory framework for public life and the legislative developments and other proposals outlined above.

**Israel**

There are no rules or regulations governing lobbyist activity in Israel. There is an Associations Law adopted in 1980 which requires the registration of associations with an appointed official, the Registrar. The latter has wide discretion in determining whether an organisation is an association or not. For example, no group may lawfully exist which undermines the state of Israel. Such a stipulation reflects the preoccupation in Israel with state security. The Associations Law applies to associations only and not to firms or companies which are covered by other parts of the civil code.

An attempt was made by individual members of the Knesset (MKs) in the 1990s to introduce regulation for lobbyists in the Knesset. This legislative initiative *inter alia* would have given the Speaker of the Knesset significant powers to disqualify lobbyists; would have forbidden lobbying activity in parts of the building; and would have allowed lobbyists entry to the building only if invited by a Member of the Knesset.
The bill passed at committee stage but never reached the Knesset plenum due to disagreement amongst Members on the definition of lobbyists, the scope of the legislation, and the difficulty with implementing the new law given the overwhelming numbers of Israeli citizens interested in the activity of the Knesset and grown accustomed to easy access to it.

Israel is a unique case given its security issues which have made it a most “suspicious” state. Concern with external threats to security and internal tensions led to the perceived need to regulate somewhat interest groups. However, in the event, given the connection between Members of the Knesset and various associations which constitute their support base, Members were reluctant to pass legislation to regulate effectively lobbyists in general as this would have adversely affected their re-election prospects. Members of the Knesset therefore continue to be besieged by zealous lobbyists who have access to most parts of the Knesset building.

**Italy**

There are no specific rules governing lobbyists in the Italian parliament.

There have been attempts to introduce regulation during the 1980s. In the Nineth Legislature (1983-1987), four bills were tabled on regulating professional public affairs activities. The committee on employment and social security discussed these bills in the Camera (the second chamber), which then prepared a unified text. The passage of this proposed legislation was interrupted by the early dissolution of parliament. Similar bills have since been tabled in 1987, 1989 and again in 1992 but have not as yet led to any concrete result.

In the Senate, national associations and organisations can normally request a card giving admittance to the Senate buildings, but not to the rooms where parliamentary committees meet.

There is pressure in Italy for the introduction of registers of pressure groups and to make it compulsory for registered groups to submit reports stating their expenses incurred and action taken in the interests of greater transparency of interest group activity. A bill presented to parliament in September 2001 which proposed *inter alia* such a register was not adopted.

**Japan**

There is no legislation regulating lobbyists in Japan.

As meetings in public between businessmen and politicians are frowned upon in Japan, such meetings tend to be held in private in exclusive tearooms and traditional restaurants close to the Japanese Diet. Discretion is the watchword with proprietors who value the custom of their clients.

As an ancient nation Japan has a highly distinctive political culture. Like many Asian states characterised by Confucian political traditions, gift giving is deeply rooted in Japanese political culture. The main problem in Japan is the fact that the boundaries between gift giving and bribery are blurred. To take a highly publicised example, in 1998 the Minister for Finance, Mitsuzuka, was forced to resign when two senior officials in his Department were accused of accepting bribes from the banks they were responsible for regulating. This affair did not revolve around cash payments but rather entertainment and a “sweetheart loan” which was intended to enable one of the officials to buy an apartment.
Japan exemplifies how difficult it is to eradicate bribery where gift giving is such an ancient and integral part of the political culture.

**Luxembourg**

There are no rules or regulations on lobbyist activity in the Luxembourg parliamentary system. There is no register or public list of lobbyists to the Chamber of Deputies, nor is there a code of conduct for representatives of pressure groups or interest groups.

The Chamber of Deputies, a parliamentary committee or one or more deputies may hear such interest or pressure groups if they choose, either on their own initiative or at the request of the pressure groups themselves. Lobbyists are not provided with any facilities.

**Netherlands**

There are no specific rules on the activities of lobbyists or pressure groups within the Dutch parliament.

The Public Relations Division of the Second Chamber provides representatives of pressure groups and lobbyists and representatives of other organisations with a special one-day pass. In exceptional cases, this pass may be valid for a maximum of two years. The pass entitles the holder to gain access to the buildings of the Second Chamber to contact members of parliament, to attend public meetings and to consult documents.

**New Zealand**

There are no rules or public registers in respect of lobbyists in the New Zealand House of Representatives. Lobbyists are not required to wear special identity cards within the parliamentary complex. In short, there are no apparent restrictions on lobbyists communicating with or visiting Members of Parliament.

As in the UK and Australia, the approach is to regulate the lobbied rather than the lobbyist. There is a ministerial code which requires all ministers and parliamentary under-secretaries to lodge an annual declaration of assets and interests with the Register of Ministers’ interests. Most recently, in October 2003, a new Members of Parliament (Pecuniary Interests) Bill was proposed. The main purpose of the bill is to require MPs to disclose their pecuniary interests. Subsequently, as a result of the Auditor-General Report published in November 2003 into the financing of organisations associated with Member of Parliament Donna Awatere Huata, the prime minister has called for a code of conduct for MPs to clarify the way in which MPs interact with ministers, government officials and lobbyists. At that time, the prime minister supported the idea that such a code of conduct could be included in this bill. However, in the event, the Bill which is scheduled to come into effect in October 2004, does not go beyond its original remit and requires Members to disclose their pecuniary interests and establishes a register of such interests to be published publicly via a website.

There is very little literature on this subject in New Zealand at the moment. The Parliamentary Information Service of the House of Representatives highlighted for the author the following sources of advice and guidance for lobbyists. First, the Clerk of the House of Representatives presented a paper to a New Zealand Law Librarians conference in 2000 entitled: “Lobbying: the gentle art of getting what you want.” This document, which advises lobbyists on points of
legislative process and procedure in New Zealand and may be accessed at www.nzllg.org.nz/events.cfm?folderid=190

Second, in November 2003 the Hon Trevor Mallard MP, Minister of Education, gave a speech entitled: “Lobbying and the government” in which he set out some friendly advice to lobbyists in the form of his “personal dos and don'ts” on lobbying. This speech may be accessed on www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=18449


Portugal

There are no specific rules or registers in respect of lobbyists or pressure groups in the Portuguese parliament. Lobbyists are subject to the general house rules governing access to, circulation and presence in the buildings of the Assembly.

Spain

There are no rules governing the activity or registration of pressure groups or lobbyists in the Spanish system.

Sweden

There are no rules or practices governing lobbyist activity in the Riksdag.

The issue of regulating lobbyists has appeared on the political agenda only in recent years. Recent private members’ bills on the registration of lobbyists in parliament have been rejected by the Riksdag as lobbying in its current form and degree is considered to be a normal and legitimate part of the political process. Until recently, conventional wisdom decreed that the benefits of the open and transparent nature of Swedish society outweighed the potential dangers of unregulated lobbying. There is public debate regarding the “dual mandate” of some members of the Riksdag who are also involved in interest groups or state authorities, and also about the involvement of interest groups in the work of state authorities. To date, however, such discussion has not led to formal proposals for specific rules or legislation to regulate lobbyists.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom does not have any specific rules and regulations concerning lobbyists and their activities. There is no register of lobbyists in the British system. The approach is to regulate the lobbied rather than the lobbyists.

House of Commons

In October 1994 Prime Minister John Major set up the Committee on Standards in Public Life, more commonly known as the Nolan Committee. The Nolan Committee set out to “examine current concerns about standards of conduct of all holders of public office, including
arrangements relating to financial and commercial activities, and make recommendations as to any changes in present arrangements which might be required to ensure the highest standards of probity in public life.”

The Nolan Committee focussed not so much on the behaviour of lobbyists vis-à-vis MPs but on the role of MPs themselves as lobbyists. The Nolan Committee reported in May 1995. It did not propose a mandatory register of lobbyists. Instead a key recommendation of the so-called Nolan reforms was a code of conduct for MPs.

Subsequently, a Code of Conduct for MPs was prepared by the House Select Committee on Standards in Public Life and was approved by the House in July 1996 together with a Guide to help MPs apply the Code. The Committee found it impossible to arrive at a satisfactory definition of “lobbyists”. Instead therefore it recommended a greater degree of disclosure by Members of all outside sources of remuneration which involved “the provision of services in their capacity as Members of Parliament.” This practice was embodied in the Guide which accompanied the Rules relating to the Conduct of Members.

Both the Code and its Guide were updated in 2002 to include a section which bans “Lobbying for reward or consideration.” The changes are worth quoting in full:

“If a financial interest is required to be registered in the Register of Members’ Interests, or declared in debate, it falls within the scope of the ban on lobbying for reward or consideration. The Committee on Standards and Privileges has provided the following Guidelines to assist Members in applying the rule:

1. Parliamentary proceedings: When a Member is taking part in any parliamentary proceeding or making any approach to a Minister or servant of the Crown, advocacy is prohibited which seeks to confer benefit exclusively upon a body (or individual) outside Parliament, from which the Member has received, is receiving, or expects to receive a pecuniary benefit, or upon any registrable client of such a body (or individual). Otherwise a Member may speak freely on matters which relate to the affairs and interests of a body (or individual) from which he or she receives a pecuniary benefit, provided the benefit is properly registered and declared.

2. Constituency interests: Irrespective of any relevant interest which the Member is required to register or declare, he or she may pursue any constituency interest in any proceeding of the House or any approach to a Minister or servant of the Crown, except that:

- where the Member has a financial relationship with a company in the Member’s constituency the guidelines above relating to parliamentary proceedings shall apply;

- where the Member is an adviser to a trade association, or to a professional (or other representative) body, the Member should avoid using a constituency interest as the means by which to raise any matter which the Member would otherwise be unable to pursue.

The Committee on Standards and Privileges has made it clear that it would regard it as a very serious breach of the rules of the House if a Member failed to register or declare an interest which was relevant to a proceeding he had initiated.”
In addition, the new Guidelines also include the recommendation of the Committee on Standards in Public Life that “reinforcing present practice regarding the declaration of interests when tabling a written notice, in addition to registration and oral declaration, the MP would also be required to identify his or her interest on the Order Paper (or Notice Paper) by way of an agreed symbol.”

The full text of the new Code of Conduct for Members and Guide to the Rules is to be found at: www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-01816.pdf

A Register of Members’ Interests was introduced in 1975 but was not taken very seriously by MPs until much later. For example, in a much-publicised case, former MP, Neil Hamilton, was found by the House of Commons Standards and Privileges Committee in 1997 to have failed to register introduction fees and hospitality with commercial interests as the rules required. His defence was that his behaviour was typical of other MPs and that he was being unfairly targeted. He therefore went on to threaten “to name names.”

Registers of Journalists and Members’ staff were introduced by the Commons in December 1985 in response to concerns about professional lobbyists masquerading as Members’ staff. However, there is as yet no public list or register of parliamentary lobbyists. Lobbyists are not treated as a separate category when passes are issued to the Palace of Westminster. They are not entitled to a security pass which would enable them to gain access to the Palace. NGOs such as Charter 88 have criticised this as a failure on the parliament to regulate itself, arguing for a set of written rules which would include the regular publication of a list of who is acting with whom, on behalf of whom, about what, at any time, with penalties for failure to comply.

In 1994, two separate Associations of Parliamentary Lobbyists announced self-imposed codes of conduct as an exercise in self-regulation. The Association of Professional Political Consultants and the Institute of Public Relations have set up registers of professional Lobbyists. Such codes and registers are voluntary and are motivated by the desire on the part of professional lobbyists to distance themselves from the “bad apples” who threaten to bring the profession into disrepute.

The Nolan Committee was not in favour of creating a Register of Lobbyists. It took the view that such a Register would confer formal status on lobbyists and give the impression that the only successful way to approach MPs or Ministers was through a registered lobbyist. This could potentially lead to unequal access. The reasoning of the Nolan Committee is worth quoting in full:

“Mention has been made in evidence to us of a proposal for a Register of Lobbyists. We are not attracted by this idea ... Our approach to the problem of lobbying is therefore based on the better regulation of what happens in Parliament. To establish a public register of lobbyists would create the danger of giving the impression, which would no doubt be fostered by lobbyists themselves, that the only way to approach successfully Members or Ministers was by making use of a registered lobbyist. This would set up an undesirable hurdle, real or imagined, in the way of access. We commend the efforts of lobbyists to develop their own codes of practice, but we reject the concept of giving them formal status through a statutory register.” (quoted in Jordan, Parliamentary Affairs, 1998, Vol. 51, p. 536).
The House of Lords

There is no official register or public list of lobbyists seeking to represent their interests to the House of Lords, and there is no code of conduct specifically applicable to such persons. In general, the facilities of the House are made available only to Members, and not to lobbyists or interest groups though Members may arrange meetings with such groups at the House if they choose.

In November 1995, the House of Lords agreed to set up a Register of Members’ Interests as recommended by its Procedure Committee. The Register, which is published annually, is divided into three categories: category 1 is mandatory and lists Lords with paid parliamentary consultancies; category 2 is also mandatory and lists Lords with financial interests in lobbying companies; finally, category 3 is optional and shows other interests (financial or non-financial) which Lords have chosen to register.

A subcommittee of the House of Lords Committee for Privileges oversees the operation of the Register of interests. This committee investigates any allegation that a Lord was in breach of the new rules. In general, Lords are expected to speak for themselves and not on behalf of outside interests. Lords with paid consultancies, or financial interests in lobbying firms, are not permitted to speak. Details of the rules governing relations between Members and third parties are constantly updated by Committee reports and revised versions of guidelines for Members.

United States of America

The USA has had long since statutory rules and regulations for lobbyists. Indeed, the USA has the longest history of regulation of all the systems considered in this report.

The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 was an extremely short piece of legislation. It was drafted very hastily and was more an afterthought added to the Legislative Reorganisation Act of 1946. This Act required the registration of any person “who by himself, or through an agent, or employee or other persons in any manner … solicits, collects, or receives money or anything of value to be used principally to aid … the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress.” The Act also required the submission of financial reports of lobbying.

The Act was widely considered to be inadequate. According to one estimate, this registration law accounted for between one sixth and one third of lobbyists working in Washington DC, with only 1% of the total money spent on lobbying being reported (Thomas, 1998: 509). The main shortcoming of the Act was its vague language which gave rise to a number of loopholes. Many lobbyists refused to register as they did not regard lobbying as their principal purpose. Others did not register as they used their own financial resources to lobby. Also, a mass lobbying campaign by a group’s membership was not covered by the Act. The Act covered only Congress so that lobbying of the White House, executive departments, regulatory agencies, and other governmental organisations were exempt. Financial reporting was a matter for lobbyists themselves to decide – there were no guidelines on what to report. Finally, investigation and enforcement of the provisions of the Act were almost non-existent.

Due to its widely acknowledged inadequacies, the 1946 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act was repealed and replaced by the new Lobby Restrictions Act which was passed in November 1995. There are three main provisions of the new law:
The definition of lobbyists was widened to include all those who seek to influence Congress, congressional staff and policy-making officials of the executive branch including the President, senior White House staff, Cabinet members and their deputies, and independent agency administrators and their assistants.

Lobbyists must register with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate within 45 days of being hired or within 45 days of making their first lobbying contact with a person covered by the Act. The obligation to register is confined to lobbyists who expect to receive more than $5,000 in a six-month period, or organisations that expect to spend more than $20,000 in a six-month period on lobbying with their own employees.

Semi-annual reports must be filed and list the issues lobbied on, a list of the institutions contacted, the lobbyists involved and the involvement of any foreign interest such as a foreign government or organisation.

Research suggests that the growth of lobby regulations in the USA at the federal, state and local levels have had a positive impact on the conduct of public policy in the USA. It seems to have ushered in a new era of openness and professionalism in government. What is less certain is that regulation has created a level political playing field. In other words, regulation has not markedly reduced the power of many “insider” interests or increased the effectiveness of “outsider” interests. The main contribution of lobbyist regulation, as the clerk of the Florida State House of Representatives has observed, is the provision of public information in the form of the identification of the players (quoted in Thomas, 1998: 514).
Conclusion

The main finding of the Report is that formal regulation tends to be more the exception than the rule in Europe and beyond.

The USA and Canada have the most developed formal rules and regulations. Australia is the only example of a system where formal regulation was introduced only to be abandoned because it was deemed to be unenforceable. Defining lobbyists has been a significant stumbling block to formal regulation. The European Parliament has circumvented this problem by avoiding the issue of definition and basing its system instead on self-definition and incentives.

At national level in Europe only Germany and the UK have formal rules and regulations but pursue different strategies. In Germany, formal rules on lobbying are included in the Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag. In the UK, by contrast, the approach is to regulate the lobbied rather than the lobbyists. This approach also characterises the systems in Australia and New Zealand.

In states where informal practices and conventions continue to prevail, the issue of more formal regulation of lobbyists is advancing up the political agenda. Typically, political scandals highlight undue influence on the part of certain interest groups vis-à-vis decision-makers in the public domain. There is, consequently, greater public and political pressure for more formal regulation. Nor is there necessarily resistance to this pressure. There is evidence to suggest that some lobbyists would welcome greater regulation in order to set themselves apart from those who threaten to bring the profession into disrepute.

Throwing public light on the relationship between civil society and government (politicians and bureaucrats) is increasingly regarded as a desirable and necessary development in the interests of good governance.
Annex IX  Provisions governing the application of Rule 9(2) – Lobbying in the European Parliament

Article 3  Code of Conduct

In the context of their relations with Parliament, the persons whose names appear in the register provided for in Rule 9(2) shall:

a) comply with the provisions of Rule 9 and this Annex;

b) state the interest or interests they represent in contacts with Members of Parliament, their staff or officials of Parliament;

c) refrain from any action designed to obtain information dishonestly;

d) not claim any formal relationship with Parliament in any dealings with third parties;

e) not circulate for a profit to third parties copies of documents obtained from Parliament;

f) comply strictly with the provisions of Annex I, Article 2, second paragraph*;

g) satisfy themselves that any assistance provided in accordance with the provision of Annex I, Article 2* is declared in the appropriate register;

h) comply, when recruiting former officials of the institutions, with the provisions of the Staff Regulations;

i) observe any rules laid down by Parliament on the rights and responsibilities of former Members;

j) in order to avoid possible conflicts of interest, obtain the prior consent of the Member or Members concerned as regards any contractual relationship with or employment of a Member’s assistant, and subsequently satisfy themselves that this is declared in the register provided for in Rule 9(2).

Any breach of this Code of Conduct may lead to the withdrawal of the pass issued to the persons concerned and, if appropriate, their firms.

* Rules on the declaration of Members’ financial interests
## Appendix B

### Summary Table of Countries covered in Report, February 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rules governing lobbyists</th>
<th>Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td>Committees may invite representatives of interest groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Lobbyists Registration Act 1989 identifies types of lobbyists. A register of lobbyists has been available to the public since 1996. This is maintained by the Lobbyists Registration Branch which is part of the Department of Industry. There is a mandatory code of ethics for lobbyists.</td>
<td>Committees may invite representatives of interest groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td>Deputations may address Standing Committees. Names of participants entered into archives to which there is public access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union:</td>
<td>Annex IX to the Rules of Procedure.</td>
<td>Passes are issued by the College of Quaestors to persons wishing to enter the European Parliament’s premises frequently to supply information to MEPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>Rule 9(2) of the Rules of Procedure. A register is kept by the College of Quaestors. The register is available to the public via the Internet.</td>
<td>Code of conduct for lobbyists and MEPs' assistants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Legal Framework</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>France: Senate</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td>Access authorised by the General Secretariat to the Palais and Salle des Séances. College of Quaestors issues passes to the Salle des Conférences and Galérie des Bustes. Establishment of groups defending private, local or professional interests is forbidden. “Study Groups” and “working groups” are permitted – subscriptions must be paid. A Senate official may act as secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany: Bundestag</td>
<td>Annex 2 of the Rules of Procedure requires that a public register be drawn up annually.</td>
<td>Committees and the Bundestag may still invite associations and experts not on the list to participate in their meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany: Bundesrat</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td>Requirement under Ethics in Public Office Act, 1995 that TDs, Senators and civil and public servants to declare financial and other interests including remunerated position as a lobbyist. Similar provisions apply under Part 15 of Local Government Act, 2001 to local government employees and councillors. Code of Conduct for office holders (Taoiseach, Tánaiste, Ministers, Ministers of State, etc.) refers to conduct in connection with dealings with lobbyists.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Committees or Members of Parliament may invite or receive interests groups if they wish.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passes issued by the Public Relations Division of the Second Chamber are valid only on date of issue. Special passes issued in rare cases for maximum of two years.</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
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<tr>
<td>Despatch No. 1/93, 22 March 1993, 11 Series, No. 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No rules, no register</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom: House of Commons</td>
<td>No rules, no register of lobbyists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are registers of journalists, “all-party” and registered groups and Members’ staff. These Registers are kept in the House of Commons library.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members must register clients or consultancies with whom they have a personal interest and outside sources of remuneration for services provided as MPs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Members may sponsor meetings of interest groups in the House.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom: House of Lords</td>
<td>No rules, no register.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| United States of America | Lobby Restrictions Act, 1995:  
  - wide definition of lobbyists  
  - a register is kept with Clerk of the House of Representatives  
  - semi-annual reports required |
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